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A Response to Seth H. Giertz
Daniel Feenberg

There are two aspects of Seth Giertzs excellent chapter that I want to talk
about. One is slightly technical; I want to try to provide some explanation for
why estimating elasticity of taxable income (ETI) is so difficult. I think this
difficulty is unappreciated by nonspecialists, who are quick to latch onto a
favorite estimate without understanding the weaknesses in the estimation.
The other aspect is a bit more philosophical and addresses the different functions of the partial equilibrium analysis done here and the general equilibrium work done a few years back in the macro group at the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO). Perhaps surprisingly, I strongly endorse the partial equilibrium approach taken here for the comparison of tax reforms.
There is a section of the chapter called "Issues That Complicate Estimation," but the complex solutions offered by the works Giertz cites may be
raising standard errors more than they are reducing bias.
Figure 6-1 below shows the share of adjusted gross income going to the
top half percent of taxpayers from 1960 to 2004; the data are from the public use files of the IRS's Statistics of Income division. Jim Poterba and I
looked at an earlier version of this figure a decade ago and saw constancy
before 1981 and after 1987, with a one-time jump for a transition. Figure
6-2 excludes capital gains-a more legitimate approach, in my opinion, but
one that shows much the same thing. We thought the likeliest explanation
for change from 1981 to 1987 was the series of Reagan tax cuts; these were
sharp for the very well off and led to an increased willingness to realize taxable income within that class. We didn't think that such a quick change in
the economy could be related to deunionization, globalization, or skillbiased technical change, because those are things that occur slowly
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Of course, resting as it did on only two effective observations, our argument was not airtight. A variety of authors went ahead to use individual
panel data; these are surveyed in Giertz's chapter. Hundreds of thousands
or even millions of tax records should be more informative than one graph,
but in fact they produce a disturbingly wide range of results.
Consider the problem of estimating the elasticity of taxable income
using data from 2001 to 200S. There was a low-income group with no
change in tax rate, a middle-income group with a small reduction in rates,
and a high-income group with a larger reduction. It is certainly possible to
treat this panel of taxpayers as a natural experiment. Regress the change in
log income on the change in log net -of-tax share and you have a readymade estimate of the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-oftax share. Giertz mentions some of the problems with this regression, but I
want to discuss the inadequacy of the available solutions.

Mean Reversion
Mean reversion is something that comes up in tax-price regressions but
isn't much noticed in other contexts. This is not because mean reversion
isn't universal-it largely is-but because it doesn't cause bias or inconsistency in the analysis of random cross-sections. But the studies cited here are
mostly nonrandom panels. Those characteristics make mean reversion a
problem. Consider a typical panel with 100 percent of base-year taxpayers
of very high income, and one in ten thousand taxpayers with a modest
income. Then the sample includes all the taxpayers going from high to low,
but only one in ten thousand of those going from low to high. Even without stratification, there will still be a tendency for high-income taxpayers to
be headed down, independent of the change in tax, and low-income taxpayers to be headed up. Given the correlation of income and change in
rates, this will tend to bias the coefficient on the change in rates.
Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000) suggest controlling for base-period income.
This makes some sense, intuitively If high base-period income signals a
likely decline in income, then adding base-period income as an explanatory
variable can absorb the bias. This approach works if mean reversion is an
AR-l process with a coefficient that is constant across incomes and has
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meaningful independence from the change in tax rates. If mean reversion is
AR-2, then using more early years could serve to control for reversion bias,
but as far as I am aware this has never been done, nor has anyone tested for
the structure of mean reversion.
Mean reversion may vary across incomes, so recent authors have followed
Gruber and Saez (2002) in including more general functional forms, up to
and including a ten-piece spline function of income. If a single Clog) linear
term in income steals variance and raises the standard errors, then a flexible
function of income is far more problematic. With a ten-piece spline, it is difficult to imagine that there is much independent variation in tax rates left to
measure. Now in the papers Giertz cites there are some other sources of variation--changes in state taxes, differences in itemized deductions or the alternative minimum tax (AMT), etc.-that do provide some non-income-related
variation. It has become the norm in economics papers to be very explicit
about what is controlled for, and let the reader figure out for himself what is
left over to serve for identification. In these papers, very little is left over, and
it isn't obvious that the leftover variance is more independent than what is
controlled for. Giertz points out that various authors' best estimates are widely spread from 0 to perhaps 1, with large standard errors. With income so partialed out, these regressions are not strong evidence that the ETI is O. A long
panel, or several concatenated panels, could ameliorate this situation-it
would have periods of stability and tax rate changes in both directions.
Several authors have used this approach, but it hasn't achieved really tight
results, and some authors have used the long time period to make separate
ETI estimates for each reform-which rather defeats the purpose.

Inequality
Another problem that Giertz brings up is the potential effect of a long-term
trend in income inequality After a decade of stability, income inequality
started to grow again in 1997 without the benefit of a tax cut. A variety of
authors have argued that there is long-term trend growth in inequality independent of taxes, and that this should be controlled for in regression estimates of ETI. The cure seems to be roughly the same as the cure for mean
reversion: add a measure of the taxpayers place in the income distribution
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as an explanatory variable. Giertz mentions that you can't compensate for
two sources of bias with one variable, which is true, but a ten-piece spline
adds ten variables, so that shouldn't be a problem.
Personally, I don't think the spline is doing much that is good. My
impression was always that the post-1997 increase in inequality was something new, and probably related to executive stock options. Most stock
options are nonqualified and are taxed as wages to the recipient. This is the
correct tax treatment, since they are deducted as wages from corporate
income, but for the purpose of measuring inequality, they should really be
looked at as capital gains. Data on stock options are not collected by the
IRS, but the CBO (2008) produced this very interesting figure (reproduced
here as figure 6-3). You can see that stock options increased by a startling
amount just during the period of increased inequality, even to reproducing
the downturn in 2001. So it is possible that the upturn in inequality is
mostly an artifact of an overheated stock market, which can hardly become
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a long-term trend. If this is the case, the spline is merely absorbing variance
that could usefully be pinning down the ETI. I should add that if you control for changes in income inequality, nothing of the evidence from the first
figure contributes to the result.
What are we to conclude about the best choice of a value for ETI? If
we don't know the true value, is it reasonable to use zero? I don't think so.
I think Giertz is right to consider a range.

Partial versus General

Giertz takes a range of estimates for ETI and considers how they affect the
forecast of revenue for several plausible tax reforms. He does this in the simplest way possible-multiplying the ETI by the relative change in margnal
tax rates by the base-period income. Obviously this is partial equilibrium,
and doesn't account for changes in relative prices or changes in individual
and government savings that might result. The CBO macro group (CBO
2004) takes a full general equilibrium approach and provides forecasts for
all major macroeconomic variables. These forecasts depend on assumptions
about how taxpayers, bondholders, congressmen, and foreign countries
will respond to the tax change and the resulting change in the deficit. A
variety of assumptions yields a wide variety of forecasts; the common theme
is that behavioral considerations-if they have any significance at allinvolve increased effort by taxpayers preparing for future tax increases.
The partial equilibrium answer is not a forecast of the future, but more
like a price list. We can think of a menu of possible tax and expenditure
changes, each with a partial equilibrium cost estimate, and let the legslature pick a budget-consistent set of choices from that menu. If the legslature respects a budget-balance constraint, the general equilibrium considerations are minimal. This approach probably makes more sense than pricing every possible combination of expenditure and financing methods. An
exception would be if there were significant interactions that make the cost
of one program dependent on the cost of another. While there are always
such interactions, are they significant enough to justify the complexity of
the general equilibrium results? Are they even as large as the discrepancies
arising from stacking order issues? Those don't seem to bother anyone.
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Consider a pure spending program. When a new bridge is proposed,
the cost is summarized by the quantity of resources times the price of
resources. The funding source isn't considered. Should it be? It is just as significant as in a tax proposal of similar magnitude.
There is a good analogy to the benefits of money economies over barter
economies. The existence of money prices reduces the need to find a coincidence of wants. The existence of revenue scores plays a similar role in
simplifying government budget planning. The fact that the revenue score
might not take into account financing decisions is not a mark against it, but
of course not an excuse to ignore the effect of the overall deficit either.
Just to show how open-minded I am, I can make an argument in favor
of general equilibrium analysis. Fifty years ago London was planning the
Victoria subway line, and did a cost-benefit analysis showing that the benefits exceeded the costs. However, the construction was then financed with
an increase in subway fares that so depressed patronage that the benefit of
the new line was wiped out. I suppose if the inefficient financing had been
known in advance, the line might not have been built. Of course, in the
long run, the line was justified even with the inefficient financing, but that
is a different story
According to most people with whom I have discussed the general
equilibrium analysis, that analysis proves that behavioral effects don't matter; but that isn't a fair summary of the implications for making tax policy.
Using the methodology of Giertz's chapter, which is conventional in a large
literature on the behavioral effects of income taxation, one can make interesting comparisons of tax reforms. For instance, Jim Poterba and I compared changing the top rate to changing the AMT. We found that changing
the AMT had few behavioral consequences, because marginal rates were
not much affected, while changing the top rate had significant behavioral
effects that changed the revenue estimate substantially. The general equilibrium analysis is really about the effects of deficit policy, not tax policy.
In summary, I think Giertz's chapter is very well done, and I am pleased
to see that, within the government, well-trained and thoughtful economists
are writing papers for the open literature on these topics. It is a far distance
from scholarship like this to the usual secretive alchemy of revenue scoring.
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